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THE DRAFTING OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242: THE ROLE OF THE
NON-REGIONAL ACTORS·
EUGENE V. RosTow* *
I.
This article is intended to take note of the fact that Se-
curity Council Resolution 242 1 is twenty-five years old.
There seems to be a good deal ofdoubt in various capitals of
the world about whether we should celebrate the anniversary
or don mourning for the occasion. The Western nations
doggedly repeat that peace negotiations between Israel and
the Arab states must be based on Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 of November 22, 1967, and 338, of October 22,
1973,2 which made Resolution 242 legally binding under Ar-
ticle 25 of the United Nations Charter. Resolution 338 com-
mands the parties to start negotiations "immediately, and
concurrendy with the cease-fire," in order to establish a just
and durable peace in accordance with the terms of Resolu-
tion 242.
Representatives of the Western Allies do not always in-
terpret Resolution 242 in exacdy the same way, however.
And the Arab nations, with the notable exception of Egypt,
claim, somewhat inconsistendy, that Resolution 242 is hope-
lessly ambiguous, and that it dearly means the opposite of
what its language was universally understood to mean when
it was debated, negotiated, and adopted. It is not yet clear
* Paper prepared for discussion at the Harris Symposium of the
Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, Washington, D.C.,
November 23, 1992.
** Professor Emeritus of Law and Public Affairs at Yale University;
Distinguished Professor of Law and Diplomacy at the National Defense
University. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1966-1969),
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1. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967).
2. S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg. at 10. U.N. Doc.
S/INF/29 (1973).
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whether Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet
Union have abandoned the pre-Gorbachev Soviet position
on Resolution 242, which was identical with that of the
Arabs.
While most Israelis agree that Israel should continue to
pursue the goal of formal peace with its neighbors, even at a
comparatively high price in territorial concessions, an in-
creasing number of Israelis doubt whether any Arabs are
willing to follow President Sadat's example by making peace
on terms compatible with the Security Council resolutions.
They argue that Israel should be content with the status quo
of the 1949 Armistice,3 as it has been modified by the Egyp-
tian-Israeli Peace Treaty4 - that is, that Israel should con-
tinue to occupy the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Go-
lan Heights. As a result of the increasing slaughter of Arabs
(and Jews) by Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
there has also been an increase in the number of Israelis will-
ing to consider massive expulsions ofPalestinian Arabs from
the occupied territories.
If the Middle East peace process survives the next few
months, there is a further reason for the diplomats to stick
closely to Resolutions 242 and 338: they are the only docu-
ments setting out principles for peacemaking on which
Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Security Council have for-
mally agreed. They were the basis for the successful peace
between Israel and Egypt in 1979. And there is little possi-
bility that the parties and the Security Council could reach
agreement on a substitute agenda.
I should make my own position clear. I remain of the
opinion that Resolution 242 was a wise judgment when it
was negotiated and adopted in 1967, and that it still provides
a fair basis for a fair peace, if the parties apply the twin reso-
lutions in strict conformity with their terms. Moreover, the
conditions of world politics ought to favor a general peace
between Israel and the Arab states. In the aftermath of the
Soviet collapse, China, India, the East European states, Rus-
3. See General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Egypt-Isr., 42
V.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement);
General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, Isr.-Leb., 42 V.N.T.S. 287;
General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Jordan, Apr. 3, 1949,42 V.N.T.S. 302;
General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949, Isr.-Syria, 42 V.N.T.S. 327.
4. Treaty of Peace, March 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., 18 I.L.M. 362.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.u. Journal of Internationl Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 491 1992-1993
1993] THE DRAFTING OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 491
sia, and most of the successor states of the former Soviet
Union have established diplomatic relations with Israel. Jor-
dan has recently indicated it is seriously considering the
same course, and even Syria seems to be moving in the same
direction. This trend leaves the Arab population of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip (often wrongly called "the" Pales-
tinians) more and more isolated politically. There never will
be a more propitious time for them to make peace.
In contrast with my view, Jon Kimche, a serious Israeli
commentator, has concluded that the continuing presence of
Resolution 242 as a source of reference has become a major
obstacle to peace negotiations in the vastly changed political
climate. He writes that:
[Resolution 242] was cobbled together in 1967 as a
stop-gap to prevent the United Nations from doing
something silly in the wake of the Six Day War. It
served its purpose then. It has done its duty. It
should now be allowed to rest in peace and obscu-
rity like so many other resolutions. The prospect
for peace in 1992 and 1993 is too real to allow it to
be further blocked by the ghost of Resolution 242.
There should now be an international ban on all
further reference to this outdated symbol of U.N.
indecision.5
This view is exemplified by the statement made earlier in the
article that Resolution 242 "provides a convenient alibi for
all who do not want peace."6
II.
Before addressing the role of the non-regional actors in
the negotiations which led to Resolution 242, we should re-
call the circumstances which produced the Six Day War, for
those circumstances profoundly affected the terms of the
agreement embodied in Resolution 242.
It is often said that the Six Day War was brought about
by accident or miscalculation, or by mutual misunderstand-
ing. This is not the case. The Six Day War was a war ofArab
5. Jon Kimche, Arab-Israeli Peace-The End of Resoluti01l 2-12, MID-
STREAM, Nov. 1992, at 2, 6.
6. Id.
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and, particularly, of Syrian and Egyptian aggression deliber-
ately incited by the Soviet Union. A CIA cable, recently de-
classified in sanitized form, sums up the situation as the
United States and the Western Allies experienced it during
the late spring of 1967. The cable reports a conversation
between a CIA officer and a medium-level Soviet official
(neither of whom is identified in the document):
1. The Soviet [official] told [his interlocutor]
that there had been "miscalculations" by the Sovi-
ets and by the Arabs. The Soviets overestimated
the Arabs' ability to employ their substantial mili-
tary strength against the Israelis while the Arabs
over-rated their own strength and underrated the
Israeli military capability and determination to win.
When [the] source asked if that meant that the Sovi-
ets had encouraged the Arabs in their hostile atti-
tude towards Israel, the Soviet official replied af-
firmatively, stating that the USSR had wanted to
create another trouble spot for the United States in
addition to the one already existing in Vietnam.
The Soviet aim was to create a situation in which
the US would become seriously involved, economi-
cally, politically, and possibly even militarily, and in
which the US would suffer serious political reverses
as a result of its siding against the Arabs. This
grand design, which envisaged a long war in the
Middle East, misfired because the Arabs failed com-
pletely and the Israeli blitzkrieg was so decisive.
Faced with this situation, the Soviets had no alterna-
tive but to back down as quickly and gracefully as
possible so as not to appear the villains of the con-
flict.
2. The Soviet [official] thought that Nasser
must go and that he would most probably be assas-
sinated in the near future by his own disillusioned
people. He said that Nasser's charge that US and
British aircraft had aided the Israeli forces was a
desperate attempt to save face in the Arab world af-
ter suffering a humiliating military defeat, and that
no one, certainly not the USSR, believed the
charge. In a final comment, the Soviet [official] said
the war has shown that the Arabs are incapable of
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unity even when their vital interests are at stake.7
Apart from supplying arms and military advisers to the Arabs
on a large scale, the Soviet effort to incite the War consisted
mainly of the deliberate dissemination of false intelligence.
Given the emotional intensity of the Arab sense ofgrievance
about the existence of Israel, the Soviet program of dis-
information was the equivalent of throwing gasoline on a
fire.
There had been active friction between Syria and Israel
since September 1966, focussed largely on water rights and
guerrilla activities. The United States was host to an interna-
tional conference entitled "Water for Peace," scheduled to
convene in Washington D.C. at the end of May 1967. In or-
der to calm the situation and head off possible Israeli retalia-
tion against Syria, the United States sought a Security Coun-
cil resolution directed against Syria. Negotiations at the
United Nations in New York produced what the United
States thought was a Soviet-American agreement on a com-
promise resolution that was so watered down that criticism
of Syria was almost invisible. The Soviet permanent repre-
sentative at the Security Council then vetoed the resolution
we believed he had promised to support.
I have often wondered in retrospect whether it was a
mistake for the United States to have invested so much time
and effort in the project of the Security Council resolution.
A sharp Israeli attack on Syria in the fall of 1966 might well
have been a more effective deterrent than the pitiful fiasco in
the Security Council.
One of the most important factors in the coming of the
War was the development ofa feverish convictibn among the
Arab masses that their armies could defeat the Israelis and
thus avenge their earlier defeats. They excused their defeats
in 1948 and 1949 because of their faulty intelligence about
Israeli capabilities, and attributed their defeat in 1956 to
British and French participation in the War.s
From September 1966 until the outbreak of war inJune
7. Cable from CIA to White House Situation Room Uune 1967) (on
file at LB] Library, Austin, Texas, Doc. No. 84 Ii, Case No. 82-156).
8. See, e.g., Speech by President Nasser on Closing of the Gulf of
Aqaba (May 22, 1967), in 3 THE ARAB-IsRAEU CONFUCT 723-29 Uohn
Norton Moore ed., 1974}.
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1967, the situation became more and more threatening, as
attacks on Israel, largely from Syria and Jordan, increased in
number and severity, and Israeli counter-moves against
those attacks increased correspondingly. During the spring
of 1967, the Soviet Union began to spread false reports that
Israel was planning to attack Syria, and that it had mobilized
twelve or fourteen brigades near the Golan Heights for the
purpose. There was no truth in these reports, as we knew
from our own military attaches and the reports of the U.N.
forces in Israel. But the Soviets kept repeating these charges
with emphasis and urgency, not simply as rumors to be
spread in bazaars, but as formal diplomatic demarches to
Egypt and the other Arab countries, and to Israel. The Is-
raelis offered to take the Soviet Ambassador to Israel on an
inspection trip of the area, but he refused.9
The Soviet program of disinformation began to have
far-reaching effects. Arab radio stations and newspapers
taunted President Nasser, saying that although he claimed to
be the big brother of the Arab people, Israel was about to
bash Syria, and he was doing nothing. lo Sensitive to criti-
cism that touched his pan-Arab nerve, Nasser responded
with great rhetorical vigor, and then with what soon became
a mobilization. First, he promised to fight if Syria were at-
tacked. These cries merged, however, with the broader
promises to lead a holy war against Israel and throw the Jews
into the sea. Soon Arab troops from Algeria and Iraqjoined
Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi, and Jordanian forces in a ring
around Israel. II
As the threat of another Arab war against Israel became
obvious during the early spring of 1967, the United States,
Great Britain, and their allies undertook active diplomatic
steps to resolve what was more and more visibly a crisis. The
American reaction to the course of events was a classic dem-
onstration of the diplomatic style of President Johnson and
9. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, FOUR ARAB-IsRAELI WARS AND THE PEACE
PROCESS 190 (3d ed. 1990).
10. See EUGENE V. ROSTOW, LAw, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 77
(1968).
11. Eugene V. Rostow, The Perils of Positivism: A Response to Professor
Quigley, 2 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 229, 232 (1992). See also Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in the Near East, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess .•
Supp. for Apr.-June 1967, at 109, U.N. Doc. S/7896 (1967).
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Secretary of State Rusk. That style was characterized by
careful preparation and a long-tenn perspective, and in-
volved sustained and energetic consultations with everyone
affected or involved. It was common for President Johnson,
discussing a proposal from the bureaucracy, to ask: "Ifwe do
what you recommend, where will we be in twenty years?
Let's think it over, and meet again on Friday." Both Rusk
and Johnson had a great deal of experience with Middle
Eastern questions, Rusk as an Assistant Secretary of State in
the Truman administration, Johnson as Democratic Majority
Leader and Chainnan of the Senate Anned Services Com-
mittee during the Eisenhower years. Johnson had played an
active and important role in the diplomatic settlement after
the Suez War of 1956.
A high-level control committee was set up within the
United States Government at the under secretary level to
consider, prepare, and propose policies the United States
and its allies might pursue in concert, both in the United Na-
tions forum and independently as well. A special committee
was appointed under the chainnanship ofAmbassadorJulius
Holmes to appraise Soviet Middle East policy. The commit-
tee concluded that the purpose of the Soviet drive in the
Middle East was to exploit Arab hostility to the existence of
Israel as a weapon which could enable them not only to gain
control of the oil reserves of the area, but also to outflank
NATO from the south, and thus neutralize Western Europe.
To check and defeat the Soviet goal in the Middle East would
require a vigorous American and allied diplomacy, a military
presence, and support for Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
In order to understand the political context of Resolu-
tion 242, it is necessary to recall the international atmos-
phere of the times. The Vietnam War was at a dismal point
militarily, and was beginning to poison American domestic
politics and the relationship of the United States with its Eu-
ropean allies as well. In addition, the relationship among the
NATO allies was still bleeding from the wounds inflicted by
United States policy during the Suez Crisis of 1956. General
de Gaulle was President ofFrance, and was pursuing a policy
ofpique towards the United States as he struggled to restore
the pride of France in the aftennath of Algeria, Suez. and
Indo-China. The Six Day War crisis of 1967 occurred less
than a year after General de Gaulle ordered the NATO
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forces out of France, and Belgium stepped fonvard to re-
ceive NATO Headquarters on Belgian soil.
Nonetheless, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk
launched an extremely active and far-reaching Middle East-
ern policy initiative based on the assumption that NATO sol-
idarity could be achieved and maintained as the solid nucleus
of a much larger coalition extending around the world. In
the period before the Six Day War broke out, high level offi-
cials from Washington frequently supplemented the work of
American ambassadors, and visited the capitals of key coun-
tries and the North Atlantic Council in order to pursue ex-
tended consultations. The British and American Middle East
teams met regularly in London and Washington to examine
the available policy alternatives and to recommend policy
goals that would command general support outside of what
was then still the Soviet bloc and the Arab world. And the
United States was in nearly constant communication with the
governments of Israel, Egypt, and the Soviet Union as well.
The objective of these exhaustive consultations was to
explore every possible way to de-escalate the growing crisis
and to prevent a war in which the Soviet Union might decide
to intervene, to clarify the goals of American policy, and to
reach agreement on a policy for the future of the Middle East
that could be supported by as large a majority as possible in
the United Nations. In President Johnson's view, America's
first goal in the area was to prevent what became the Six Day
War, to face down possible Soviet intervention without pro-
voking it, to promote NATO solidarity in every possible way,
and to push the Arabs towards peace after twenty years of
intransigent resistance to the idea of peace with Israel. I be-
lieve that these consultations, coupled with the universal
perceptions of Soviet, Syrian, and Egyptian aggression, per-
mitted the United States and Great Britain, acting together,
to achieve something close to unanimity among the Western
allies, and to obtain the passage of Resolution 242. This was
the only time since 1947 that the Western bloc had agreed
about how to handle an episode in the long Arab war against
Israel.
III.
While these efforts were being pursued, Nasser re-
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quested that the U.N. peacekeeping force withdraw from the
frontier between Israel and Egypt, including Sharm-el-
Sheikh, at the mouth of the Straits of Tiran. 12 U Thant, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, replied that if Nas-
ser wished the U.N. peacekeeping forces to withdraw from
part of the area they were patrolling, he would have to ask
those troops to withdraw from the entire frontier. IS By prior
agreement with Nasser, the Indian and Yugoslav troops
which were part of the U.N. force withdrew immediately,I"
thus destroying the force as any kind ofobstacle to war, how-
ever fragile.
President Johnson forcefully denounced the Egyptian
move for two reasons. Manifestly, the withdrawal of the U.N.
forces greatly increased the risk of war. In addition, it had
been agreed by the parties in 1957, as part of the price for
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, that any use of force by
Egypt to close the Straits of Tiran would be treated as an
armed attack not only by the Israelis, but also by Great Brit-
ain and the United States, who had negotiated the agree-
ment between Israel and Egypt, and guaranteed the Straits
as an international waterway.15 That agreement provided
for a special procedure of delay to be followed if Egypt ever
did try to close the Straits of Tiran. 16
When the Egyptian troops manned the guns controlling
the Straits and announced that the watenvay was closed to
Israeli shipping, the first shot in the Six Day War was effec-
tively fired. It is no wonder that in a major speech on June
19, 1967, PresidentJohnson said: "Ifa single act of folly was
more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it
was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the
Straits ofTiran would be closed. The right of innocent mari-
12. See Report of the SecretaT)'-General on the Withdrawal 0/ the [·mtcd XatlollS
Emergency Force, U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess., Annex. Agenda
Item 5, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6730 (1967).
13. See id. at 6.
14. See BAILEY, supra note 9, at 199.
15. See Eugene V. Rostow. Legal Aspects ofthe Search/or Peace 111 the Jfiddle
East, 64 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 64. 67 (1970). Set also Aide Memoire
Handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on Feb. II. 1957. by Secrelary
of State Dulles, in 3 THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT. supra nOle 8. al 637.
16. See. e.g., Aide Memoire by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold on
Conditions Governing Withdrawal ofU.N.E.F. (Aug. 5. 1957). ill 6 I.L.M.
593-602 (1967).
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time passage must be preserved for all nations." 17
The period between May 23 and June 5 was one of fran-
tic diplomatic effort by the United States, its allies, and many
other friendly countries around the world to defuse the crisis
by persuading Nasser to restore the situation in the Sinai as
it had been before the dissolution of the U.N. peacekeeping
force. That campaign was supplemented by a determined ef-
fort to organize an allied naval force to convoy Israeli and
other vessels through the Straits ofTiran. The idea was sug-
gested by the British Government, and was embraced as a
matter of extreme urgency by Johnson and Rusk. Former
President Eisenhower confirmed that he had indeed guaran-
teed the Straits of Tiran, and assured President Johnson of
his full support, as a matter of national honor, if Johnson
decided to use force. IS
In view of the controversy then raging in Congress
about the war in Vietnam, it was deemed politic to obtain a
Congressional resolution specifically supporting military ac-
tion to break the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. Britain,
the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia
quickly sent vessels to the Canal prepared to carry out the
task. When Secretaries Rusk and McNamara consulted Con-
gressionalleaders on the subject, however, they found great
reluctance to authorize "another Vietnam," and a decided
preference for supporting an Israeli action in self-defense.
When Jordan put its armed forces under Egyptian control,
President Johnson concluded that war was inevitable. It
would have been unconscionable for the United States to
press the Israelis further to delay recourse to their legal right
of self-defense.
The difference between Congressional opinion and the
President's was never resolved. As the Arab mobilization
reached a climax, the war exploded. The Soviet Union,
which had resisted American proposals for a cease-fire for
days, suddenly changed its mind as the Arab armies surren-
dered and the Israelis reached the Suez Canal.
17. President Lyndon B. johnson, Principles for Peace in the Middle
East, Address Before the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference
for Educators Uune 19, 1967), in DEP'T ST. BULL., july 10. 1967, at 33
[hereinafter johnson on Middle East].
18. See Rostow, The Perils of Positivism, supra note II, at 233.
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IV.
The long months of study and diplomacy devoted to the
Middle Eastern crisis of 1966-67 incited a prompt articula-
tion of Anglo-American policy after the Six Day War. Presi-
dent johnson's speech ofjune 19, 1967 announced the ideas
which became Resolution 242 after four more months of
heated debate in the Security Council, the General Assem-
bly, and then the Security Council again. johnson's state-
ment ofjune 19 had several key points:
(1) It rejected proposals that Israel withdraw its forces
to the Armistice Lines as they stood onjune 4. "This is not a
prescription for peace," the President said, quoting Ambas-
sador Arthur Goldberg, "but for a renewal of hostilities."19
(2) There needed to be peace between the parties, real
peace, before there could be any troop withdrawal.20 This
principle, not spelled out in detail in the june 19th speech,
was fully discussed before the United Nations. It reflected
the history of the 1957 agreement which settled the Suez
War of 1956. That settlement required Israel to withdraw
from the Sinai in exchange for a series of promises by Egypt,
all ofwhich were broken: to respect Israel's borders, to allow
Israel free passage on the international watenvays of the re-
gion, and to make peace. More than any other factor, the
Egyptian breach of the 1957 agreement led to the basic re-
quirement of Resolution 242 that Israel could remain in the
occupied territories until the parties establish "a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East."21 Secretary Rusk was a
particularly strong advocate of this position because of
Egypt's violation of the 1957 agreement. The correlative
principle of the Resolution, that the new and secure bounda-
ries of Israel did not need to be the same as the Armistice
Demarcation Lines of 1949, simply echoed the terms of the
Armistice Agreements of 1949. These provided that the Ar-
mistice Lines were not to be considered political boundaries
but could be changed when the parties moved from armistice
to peace.
(3) The agreements of peace needed to be negotiated
by the parties. "It is hard to see how it is possible for nations
19. Johnson on Middle East, supra note 17. at 34.
20. See id.
21. S.C. Res. 242. supra note 1. at 8.
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to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason to-
gether," said President johnson, expanding on an earlier
statement that "[t]he nations of the region have had only
fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they need
now are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that
will give them security against terror, destruction, and
war."22
(4) All the states in the region had the same right to
have their territorial integrity and political independence
respected; threats to end the life of any nation had become a
burden to the peace.23
(5) There needed to be justice for the refugees.24
(6) Maritime rights through the international water-
ways of the area needed to be respected.25
(7) The special interest of the three great religions
represented in jerusalem needed also to be assured.26
Two of these issues proved to be especially critical in the
diplomacy of obtaining the passage of the Resolution in
1967, and in the subsequent struggle to implement it: first,
the issue of coupling Israeli withdrawals and agreements on
a state of peace; and second, the question of how much with-
drawal, i.e., whether Israel is required by Resolution 242 to
withdraw to the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949. Since
Resolution 242 calls on Israel to withdraw only from "terri-
tories occupied" in the course of the Six Day War, that is,
not from all the territories or from the territories it occupied
in the course of the War, and since most of the boundaries in
question are no more than armistice lines specifically desig-
nated as not being political boundaries,27 it is hard to believe
that professional diplomats seriously claim in 1993 that Se-
curity Council Resolution 242 requires that Israel must re-
turn to the 1967 armistice lines. This Arab position is partic-
ularly bizarre applied to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
where the jewish people have an incontestably valid claim





27. See, e.g., Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, supra note
3, art. V, para. 2, 42 V.N.T.S. at 256.
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under the original mandate28 and Article 80 of the U.N.
Charter29 to make close settlements on the land.
Five and one half months of vehement public and pri-
vate diplomacy in 1967 made it perfectly clear what the miss-
ing definite article in Resolution 242 means. Ingeniously
drafted resolutions calling for withdrawal from all the terri-
tories were defeated in the Security Council and the General
Assembly, one after another. Speaker after speaker made it
explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the fragile
and vulnerable Armistice Demarcation Lines, but should re-
tire once peace was made to what Resolution 242 called "se-
cure and recognized" boundaries, agreed on by the parties.
In negotiating such agreements, the parties should take into
account, among other factors, security considerations, as-
sured access to the international waterways of the region, a
just settlement of the refugee problem, and, of course, their
respective legal claims. In 1967, J. Lawrence Hargrove, the
Director of the American Society of International Law, was
Senior Adviser on International Law to the United States
Mission to the United Nations. In testimony before a sub-
committee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in
1971, he said:
The language "from territories" was regarded at
the time of the adoption of the resolution as of high
consequence because the proposal put fonvard by
those espousing the Egyptian cause was withdrawal
from "the territories." In the somewhat minute de-
bate which frequently characterizes the period
before the adoption of a United Nations resolution,
the article "the" was regarded of considerable sig-
nificance because its inclusion would seem to imply
withdrawal from all territories which Israel had not
occupied prior to the June war, but was at the pres-
ent time occupying.
Consequently, the omission of "the" was in-
28. See British Mandate for Palestine, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OJ. 1007,
1008-12 (1922).
29. See U.N. CHARTER art. 80, para. 1 ("nothing in this Chartcr shall bc
construed in or of itself to alter in any manner Ihc rights whatsoc\'cr ofany
states or any peoples or the terms of existing intcrnational instrumcnts
....").
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tended on our part, as I understood it at the time,
and was understood on all sides, to leave open the
possibility of modifications in the lines which were
occupied as of June 4, 1967, in the final settle-
ment.30
In the case of Egypt, Israel accepted an agreement without
territorial change as sufficient to satisfy Resolution 242.
This agreement provided, inter alia, for the demilitarization
and international protection of the Sinai Desert. The Sinai
Desert, occupied by Israel between 1967 and 1979, had been
Egyptian territory, and was never part of the mandate. The
Egyptian model fits neither the Jordanian nor the Syrian
case, however. Israel has a better legal claim to the West
Bank than Jordan, and every military group which has stud-
ied the problem agrees that Israeli security requires control
of the high places of the West Bank of the Jordan River, at
the very least. And in the case of the Golan Heights, I have
heard former Secretary of Defense McNamara say that if he
were the Israeli Minister of Defense, he could never agree to
giving them up. In short, what Resolution 242 does is to au-
thorize the parties to make whatever territorial changes the
situation requires. It does not require the Israelis to transfer
to the Arabs all, most, or indeed any of the occupied territo-
ries. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty awards to an Arab
state more than 90% of the territory Israel captured in the
Six Day War. Can anyone say with a straight face that the
Resolution requires the transfer of occupied territory in the
West Bank and the Golan Heights as well? It surely permits
such a transfer if the parties accept it. But it does not require
it.
It is quite true that during the negotiations leading to
the adoption of Resolution 242, some American representa-
tives said that the Resolution contemplated only minor
changes in the Armistice Demarcation Lines between Israel
and Jordan as the parties drew a permanent boundary. In a
mood of post-war hope and euphoria, Israel had just offered
the Arabs a return to the Armistice Lines, with minor
30. Middle East, 1971: The Need to Strengthen the Peace: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Near East of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 187 (1971) (statement of]. Lawrence Hargrove, Director of Studies.
American Society of International Law).
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changes only for jordan, in exchange for peace. The Arabs
spumed that offer and announced instead a policy of "no
negotiations, no recognition, no peace."31 At one point, So-
viet Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether Resolution 242
meant only minor changes in the Armistice Lines for jordan.
He was told that so far as the United States was concerned
that was the present position, but that if the Arabs persisted
in their rejectionist policy, the American view of the territo-
rial question might well change. Resolution 242 permitted
very different outcomes, and security considerations were se-
rious. Ambassador Dobrynin said that on that basis the So-
viet Union could agree to this interpretation.32 The next day
he telephoned to report that he would have to withdraw his
approval. Evidently, his government had decided to have its
cake and eat it too, if it could. The Soviet Union repeated
the Arab line until it expired, and the Russian government
since Gorbachev has not disclosed its hand.
Thus Resolution 242 leaves the issue of territorial settle-
ment to the agreement of the parties. It was, however, nego-
tiated with the boundary between Israel and jordan in the
foreground. The United States has remained firmly opposed
to the creation of a third Palestinian state on the territory of
t.1}e Palestine mandate. An independent jordan or a jordan
linked in an economic union with Israel is desirable from the
point of view of everybody's security and prosperity. And a
predominantly jewish Israel is one of the fundamental goals
ofIsraeli policy. There is therefore no objective reason why
these conflicting claims cannot be reconciled at the negotia-
tions now being held. On the other hand, the risk that Arab
negotiators might be murdered if they signed such agree-
ments is a factor they can never ignore.
Resolution 242 was distilled with great pain from the ag-
ony of the prolonged Arab war against jewish settlement in
Palestine. It is a fair compromise and offers a fair foundation
for a just and lasting peace.
31. See, e.g., Summary of Resolution of Arab Summit Conference. Khar-
toum, Sudan (Sept. 1, 1967). reprillted ;11 2 N.Y.l1. J. I:''T'L L & POL 209
(1969).
32. See Rostow, The Perils oj Pos;tit'ism, supra note II. at 242.
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